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Address to Evidencers 
William Twining∗
Evidencers—for that is the collective name for the people in the 
room. 
I am quite overwhelmed by this honor, which was completely 
unexpected.  I am particularly pleased that it was on the basis of peer 
review.  It is especially gratifying to have my name bracketed with two 
of my heroes: John Henry Wigmore and Jack Weinstein.  Thank you 
for the award; thank you for coming; thank you Michael Risinger as 
Chair and impresario; thanks to Peter Tillers for his kind words.  I 
have so many debts of gratitude that I could take up all of my allotted 
time.  I shall confine myself to two special ones: first, my wife Pene-
lope of fifty years, four months, and five days—without whom I would 
not be here—and, second, to the University of Miami Law School, 
which for nearly thirty years has provided a supportive environment; 
stimulating colleagues; my friend, collaborator, and co-teacher Terry 
Anderson; and the opportunity to inflict modified Wigmorean analy-
sis in the first year, where it unquestionably belongs as part of basic 
legal method. 
The story is told in Coral Gables that the late Clifford Alloway 
used to advise his students: “If you want to learn how to think, take 
Anderson; if you want to understand the Law of Evidence, take [Mi-
chael] Graham, if you want to pass the Bar, take me.”  Different per-
spectives on Evidence have always been present at Miami. 
Rather than be very serious in ten to fifteen minutes, let me in-
dulge you in a sneak preview of the chapter on Evidence in my forth-
coming memoirs.  These will be completed after I finally retire, but 
you will need to patient in that with Jack Weinstein as my role model, 
that is at least a dozen years off.  I am a mere seventy-three. 
I have drafted the first sentence of this memoir: “I started my 
study of Evidence on All Fools Day (April 1st) 1972.”  That was the 
date on which I took up my appointment at the University of Warwick 
Law School, then in its third year of operation.  Warwick was commit-
 ∗ Quain Professor of Jurisprudence Emeritus, University College London; Visit-
ing Professor, University of Miami School of Law. 
TWINING_FINAL 5/30/2008  1:09:44 PM 
880 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:879 
 
ted institutionally to “broadening the study of law from within”; that 
is, developing alternatives to the expository or blackletter orthodoxy 
that had been dominant in English academic law.  At my interview I 
was asked by Geoffrey Wilson, the founding Head: “What subject are 
you going to Warwickise?”  I was well prepared and I replied “Either 
Land Law or Evidence.”  By then Patrick Atiyah had done Torts and 
was working on Contract;1 Wilson himself was dealing with UK Con-
stitutional law; other colleagues had occupied territory, as law teach-
ers do.  I was quite keen on taking on land, but Patrick McAuslan 
wanted to bring public law perspectives to bear on land law and I 
yielded the territory to him.  He produced the first English academic 
text on planning law2 and has since become the world’s leading ex-
pert on urban planning and land reform in developing countries. 
All that I knew—or at least thought I knew—about evidence was 
Jerome Frank’s campaign to urge us to take fact-finding seriously and 
the intriguing fact that Jeremy Bentham, our most prolific jurist, had 
written more on evidence than any other subject.  I quickly discov-
ered two things:  that there was a vast intellectual heritage and history 
which stretched back through Michael and Adler, Wigmore, Thayer, 
Fitzjames Stephen, to Bentham, to medieval and classical rhetoric, 
and included  probability theory, debates about the existence of God, 
the history of historiography, the philosophy of science and other 
mainstream strands in the Western intellectual tradition.  As Ben-
tham rightly said: “The field of evidence is no other than the field of 
knowledge.”3
My second discovery was that I had in fact been exposed to evi-
dentiary and inferential issues in a variety of contexts without perceiv-
ing them as such: early on, I found that my daughter was studying The 
Murder of Herodes as a Greek set text that was crying out for Wigmor-
ean analysis; that reminded me that at school I had studied Cicero 
and Demosthenes and some Aristotle (but not Quintillian); and, out 
of hours, I had been a fan of Sherlock Holmes, Poirot, and Maigret; 
as an undergraduate, I had spent many hours investigating the family 
legend that a great-great uncle had been wrongly convicted of assault-
ing a young lady in a railway carriage (the real culprit was thought to 
be the Prince of Wales); that I had been involved in controversies 
about coercive interrogation and allegations of torture in Northern 
 1 P.S. ATIYAH, ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW (1970); P.S. ATIYAH, THE 
RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979). 
 2 PATRICK MCAUSLAN, LAND LAW AND PLANNING (1975). 
 3 Jeremy Bentham, An Introductory View of the Rationale of Evidence, in 2 WORKS OF 
JEREMY BENTHAM 5 (John Bowring ed., 1843). 
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Ireland; and traditional dispute processes in Africa.  I devoured legal 
biographies and accounts of famous trials and was vaguely puzzled as 
to why these had not featured in my legal education.  And so on and 
so on.  The label “evidence” brought all these seemingly disparate in-
terests together under one rubric.  Like Moliere’s Monsieur Jourdain 
with prose, I learned that I had been evidencing all my life.  Indeed, 
evidence is a dilettante’s dream.  It was only later that I learned that 
law is virtually the only discipline that treats evidence as a distinct 
area of expertise—and even that is largely confined to the common 
law setting.  The same experience also applies to stories: it is only 
when one focuses on narrative as a subject of sustained attention that 
one realises how pervasive, varied, important, and seductive stories 
and story-telling are in many different legal contexts. 
My commitment to the project of rethinking evidence was sealed 
by two incidents involving Sir Rupert Cross, rightly admired as virtu-
ally the only evidence scholar of his generation in the U.K.  Cross was 
a splendid man: he was blind since childhood, clear, robust, and out-
spoken, with a good sense of practicalities.  In September 1972, dur-
ing a heated debate on reform of criminal evidence, Cross rashly said: 
“I am working for the day when my subject is abolished.”  My first re-
action was political outrage: I believed and still believe in strong safe-
guards for the accused.  But my second reaction was intellectual: how 
could problems of evidence and inference in law be abolished?  The 
equation of the subject with the rules of evidence was just the kind of 
rule-centered, doctrinal approach to law that Warwick was seeking to 
subvert.  So the starting-point for inquiry was: what would one study 
about evidence in law if there were no rules? 
The second episode involving Cross was rather different: in the 
early 1970s, I enquired in Wildy’s, the lawyers’ bookshop in Lincoln’s 
Inn, about the availability and price of Bentham’s five-volume Ration-
ale of Judicial Evidence.  It moves rather slowly, I was told, and there is 
someone ahead of you in the queue.  They took me to their battered 
card index file—under Bentham’s Rationale was listed R. Cross, 1938.  
No copy had come available.  So, I suspect that Cross never read the 
greatest classic in our field—an omission unfortunately common 
among evidence scholars of the time.  For an evidence scholar to ad-
mit this today would be like a specialist in French literature confess-
ing to not having got through all of Proust. 
Over time I gravitated from intellectual history, to the law of evi-
dence (Yes, I did study and teach it!), to the logic of proof, to prob-
abilities, to practicalities of constructing cogent arguments on ques-
tions of fact, on to the roles of narrative and story-telling and their 
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relationship to argumentation, and back to evidence as a multi-
disciplinary field, not only in law, but generally.  Given time, I could 
tell many other stories—about Dean Wigmore getting a friend to 
send postcards from Europe each summer to his colleagues to hide 
the fact that he was beavering away in a cottage on the shores of Lake 
Michigan—perhaps like one of our contemporaries.  About Mrs. 
Wigmore copying out the manuscript of the first edition of the Trea-
tise in longhand so that it could be sent by post, thereby saving the 
fare from Chicago to Boston; about Jeremy Bentham’s auto-icon; 
about collaborating with a Shakespeare scholar on interpreting love 
letters as evidence; and about Lord Denning as a story-teller.  But 
time is short: so let me end with two brief stories: 
First, once upon a time, I walked into a law school.  I had just 
had lunch with Peter Tillers at Legal Seafoods—only two glasses of 
wine—before giving a public lecture at the New England Law School, 
which, as you know, was once the Portia Law School and is now made 
of plate glass.  I walked straight into a plateglass window and nearly 
knocked myself out.  Concussed and with a bloody nose, I stiffened 
my upper lip and decided to continue.  I had blood dripping from 
my nose and over my suit and was a bit unsteady on my feet.  So I told 
my audience what had happened.  I have never had a more sympa-
thetic audience for Wigmorean analysis. 
Second, some of us—David Schum, Terry Anderson, Peter Till-
ers, and others—have recently been involved in a multi-disciplinary 
program at University College London about the extent to which 
there is, or could be, an integrated field (or “science”) of evidence 
that transcends all disciplines that involve empirical inquiry.  Last 
month we had an exciting conference at the British Academy with 
people from at least twenty disciplines participating—nearly all from 
the humanities and social sciences.  Sadly, hardly anyone came from 
the physical sciences.  Some of us have been surprised by the amount 
of skepticism, even hostility, to the idea that there are general princi-
ples of inferential reasoning and basic concepts, such as relevance, 
probative value, credibility, that can transcend disciplinary contexts.  
So a lot of people were resistant to Dave Schum’s thesis outlined in 
Evidential Foundations of Probabilistic Reasoning.  This was not only or 
even mainly epistemological skeptics or relativists or post-modernists 
of various kinds.  Some of the hostility was justifiably directed to the 
excesses of evidence-based medicine and evidence-based policy.  
Some wanted narrative to supplant rather than complement evi-
dence.  But most either wanted to emphasise the uniqueness of their 
discipline and its special problems or else were dismissive of concerns 
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about methodology: many historians are inclined to say “We don’t 
think about it, we just do it”; such attitudes were epitomized by one 
distinguished scientist who said in essence that there are no problems 
about evidence and inferential reasoning in randomised clinical tri-
als.  One only has to look at the papers or television to see that evi-
dence pervades the news and our public life: DNA, WMD, crime 
scene investigation, evidence-based medicine and evidence-based pol-
icy, Patricia Cornwell, this week’s disputed election in Kenya, 
Dawkins’ The God Delusion, René Weis on Shakespeare.4  I leave you 
with this thought: this audience is almost unique in being made up of 
specialists on evidence; evidence is now a field whose time has come; 
and, as Jeremy Bentham said, “the field of evidence is no other than 
the field of knowledge.”  Maybe we do have something to offer other 
disciplines. 
 4 RENÉ WEIS, SHAKESPEARE UNBOUND: DECODING A HIDDEN LIFE (2007). 
